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FOREWORD
Public government statements have cited cyberattacks by terrorists as a major concern for national
security. To date, no large-scale cyber-terrorist attack
has been observed, but terrorists are known to be using the Internet for various routine purposes. The discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 was a milestone in the arena
of cybersecurity because, although a malware attack
on industrial control systems was long believed to be
theoretically possible, it was different to see malware
used in reality to cause real physical damage. Stuxnet
demonstrated that a sufficiently determined adversary with sufficient resources might be able to damage U.S. critical infrastructure physically through a
cyber attack. Did Stuxnet change the threat of cyberterrorism?
This monograph examines cyberterrorism before
and after Stuxnet by addressing three questions: 1)
Motive—Are terrorists interested in launching cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructures? 2) Means
—Are terrorists building capabilities and skills for
cyberattacks? and, 3) Opportunity—How vulnerable
are U.S. critical infrastructures? Answers to these
questions give a characterization of the post-Stuxnet
cyberterrorism threat. The next question is why a major cyber-terrorist attack has not happened yet; this is
explained from a cost-benefit perspective. Although
cyberterrorism may not be an imminent threat, there
are reasons to be concerned about the long-term threat
and inevitability of cyberattacks.
It is important to assess frequently the threat
landscape and current government policies for enhancing the protection of national infrastructures.
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Therefore, the Strategic Studies Institute commends
this monograph to its readers.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Terrorists are known to use the Internet for communications, planning, recruitment, propaganda, and
reconnaissance. They have shown interest in carrying out cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructures,
although no such serious attacks are known publicly to have occurred. The discovery of the Stuxnet
malware in July 2010, and its analysis over the next
several months, was widely believed to have been a
landmark event in cybersecurity, because it showed
that cyberattacks against industrial control systems,
hypothesized for a long time, are actually possible.
After Stuxnet, there were public concerns that terrorists might be encouraged to acquire capabilities for
similar cyberattacks.
This monograph examines cyberterrorism before
and after Stuxnet by addressing questions of:
1. Motive—Are terrorists interested in launching
cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructures?
2. Means—Are terrorists building capabilities and
skills for cyberattacks?
3. Opportunity—How vulnerable are U.S. critical
infrastructures?
It is noted that no serious cyberterrorism attacks
have occurred after Stuxnet. This can be explained
from a cost-benefit perspective that has not changed
since Stuxnet. It can be argued that U.S. policies can
really address vulnerabilities only by strengthening
defenses of critical infrastructures.

ix

CYBERTERRORISM AFTER STUXNET
INTRODUCTION
There have been widely publicized government
concerns that terrorists might be turning to cyberattacks. For instance, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Director Robert Mueller testified to a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee in March 2012 that “while
to date terrorists have not used the Internet to launch a
full-scale cyber attack, we cannot underestimate their
intent. . . . (terrorists are) using cyberspace to conduct
operations.”1 Cited examples of terrorist “cybersavvy”
included al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which
publishes an online magazine entitled Inspire, and
the use of Twitter by the Somali group Al-Shabaab.
The prospect of cyberterrorism is understandably
troubling, because of the wide range of possible targets and attack vectors, which would be challenging
in terms of defense. In theory, terrorists of sufficient
skills might be able to attack the power grid, air traffic,
public transport, financial networks, communication
networks, emergency response, utilities, manufacturing plants, or military networks. Possible cyberattacks
could range from blatant distributed denial of service
(DDoS) or sabotage, to more stealthy attacks for data
theft or remote control.
According to Gabriel Weimann, “psychological, political, and economic forces have combined to
promote the fear of cyber terrorism.”2 The concept
combines two modern psychological fears: the fear of
random violence and the fear of computer technology.
Also, cyberterrorism has been caught up in the U.S.
political aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), when
more terrorist attacks seemed to be a distinct possibil-
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ity, and the United States felt vulnerable. The prospect
of cyberattacks causing catastrophic damage from a
remote computer seemed like the ultimate threat, perhaps hyped beyond the actual threat level. Weimann
states that a threat is real but must be assessed realistically without overdue emotional influences.
The first obstacle in assessing cyberterrorism are
the various definitions that have been proposed. No
single definition has been universally accepted (just as
a common definition of terrorism has been elusive). The
term might be traced back originally to Barry Collin,3
who noted that physical infrastructures increasingly
are controlled by computers, and that dependence on
computer networks increased our vulnerability to cyberattacks. Examples of potential targets for cyberattacks included: financial systems to disrupt stock exchanges; air-traffic control to crash aircraft; pressure
valves in gas lines to cause explosions; and computer
controls at pharmacies or food processing plants to
poison the population. Like traditional terrorist acts,
cyberterrorism exhibits scale (mass destruction) and
publicity. Collin postulated that cyberattacks would
appeal logically to terrorists for their relative ease and
safety. At the same time, Collin predicted that cyberterrorism would create new challenges to counter terrorism because of the need to acquire cyber expertise
and eliminate vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures.
Professor Dorothy Denning offered a definition
of “cyberterrorism” in testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee in May 2000 that has been
widely cited:
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean unlawful
attacks and threats of attack against computers, net-
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works and the information stored therein when done
to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in
furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to
qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in
violence against persons or property, or at least cause
enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to
death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be
examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on
their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.4

A more concise definition is “politically motivated
hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such
as loss of life or severe economic damage.”5 This definition consists of three parts: 1) politically driven intention; 2) serious effects; and, 3) computer networks
as the means. This meaning shares commonalities
with the U.S. Department of State definition of terrorism in Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d): “Premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups
or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience.”6
Generally, Denning’s definition of cyberterrorism
is the one used here. Definitions are problematic, because complicated scenarios could be imagined. For
example, a physical attack on computers controlling
critical infrastructures could cause serious harm; in
this case, computers are the target but not the means.
Also, terrorists use computer networks for recruiting,
planning, communications, and target reconnaissance.
These are routine activities that most people use the
Internet for, but might be argued to be cyberterrorism
in the sense of “cyber activities supporting terrorism.”
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Aside from the problem of definition, there is the
practical problem of determining whether a particular cyberattack qualifies as cyberterrorism.7 First, attribution of cyberattacks to the real attacker is difficult and often impossible. Attackers can compromise
other computers to use as intermediaries, or channel
through anonymizing proxies that hide their Internet
protocol (IP) address. Second, the complete effects of
an attack might be concealed, e.g., if stealthy malware
has been installed without detection. Third, even if
attribution is solved, there is another problem: determining the intent of the attacker. For instance, it
would be difficult to determine if a hacking group is
acting for its own gain or was hired by another party.
Aside from definitions, the cyberterrorism literature has addressed mostly: 1) how terrorists use the
Internet for propaganda, recruiting, fund raising, intelligence gathering, and planning; 2) vulnerabilities
in critical infrastructures, providing opportunities for
cyberattacks; and, 3) whether cyberterrorism is a real
threat. Most of the literature understandably predates
Stuxnet, since the discovery of Stuxnet was relatively
recent. Stuxnet vividly demonstrated to the world
that industrial systems can be sabotaged physically by
malware, a threat long believed to be possible by the
cybersecurity community but not actually observed.
The literature has not really explored whether Stuxnet
had any effect on cyberterrorism.
This monograph examines cyberterrorism before
and after Stuxnet by addressing these questions: 1)
Motive—Are terrorists interested in launching cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructures? 2)
Means—Are terrorists building capabilities and skills
for cyberattacks? and, 3) Opportunity—How vulnerable are U.S. critical infrastructures? It is noted that
no serious cyberterrorism attacks have occurred af4

ter Stuxnet; this can be explained from a cost-benefit
perspective, which has not changed since Stuxnet.
In that sense, cyberterrorist attacks do not seem to
be imminent, although Stuxnet has implications for
the cost-benefit weights of potential future attacks.
It can be argued that U.S. policies can really address
only the opportunities for terrorism (but not motive
or means) by strengthening the defenses of critical
infrastructures.
STUXNET
Stuxnet was a milestone in the field of cyber scecurity. Although experts had long believed that a
malware attack on industrial control systems was
possible, it was different to see it used in reality as
a surgical strike against an enemy’s infrastructure.
Stuxnet revealed the level of sophistication required
for a “weaponized” malware.
The unusual size and sophistication of Stuxnet,
discovered in June 2010, took a team of antivirus companies several months to diagnose its functions fully.
Today, Stuxnet is well understood8 and documented9
but still surprising in the level of effort invested by the
terrorists and its technical sophistication. The description of Stuxnet here is summarized from the literature.
Stuxnet stood out from typical malware due to its
large size (around 500 kilobytes [kb]) and complexity.
It was unusual in that it used two stolen digital certificates and multiple zero-day exploits. As zero-day exploits are valuable, typical malware usually contains
at most one zero-day (or often none, as reused known
exploits can still be effective against unpatched targets). The level of investment suggests that the target
was considered very valuable, but it took months to
analyze the payload and ascertain the probable target.
5

Methods of Spreading.
The initial infection vector was suspected to be a
removable drive because the target network was not
connected to the Internet. Once a personal computer
(PC) has been infected, Stuxnet uses various means to
spread through local networks to other PCs:
•	
Stuxnet detects the presence of removable
drives (probably a universal serial bus [USB]
flash) and installs several files for infecting a
Windows PC, exploiting a vulnerability in the
processing of shortcuts and .lnk files (MS10046). When the infected drive is opened in a PC,
Stuxnet’s binaries will be executed.
•	
Stuxnet exploits a vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler service to spread by sending a malicious print request to a target PC over
a remote procedure call (RPC).
•	Stuxnet exploits an old vulnerability in Windows Server Service (MS08 067) which does not
properly handle specially crafted RPC requests.
•	Stuxnet spreads to other PCs through network
shares.
•	Stuxnet takes advantage of a hard-coded default password in Siemens Simatic WinCC software (CVE-2010-2772). The password allows
privileged access to a back-end WinCC database. Once connected to the database, Stuxnet
injects a copy of itself into the database, thereby
infecting the PC running the WinCC database.
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Target.
While Stuxnet is capable of spreading more aggressively, it is interested only in Windows PCs running
Simatic Step 7 software, because the ultimate target
was a Siemens Simatic S7 PLC (programmable logic
controller). Stuxnet contains code to test that the target is correct. Also, the analysis of the payload pointed
to a Siemens Simatic S7 PLC target. PLCs are specialized computers used widely to control various types
of industrial equipment found in factories, assembly
lines, manufacturing plants, and critical infrastructures.10 Like PCs, PLCs are programmable for flexibility but differ in a few important respects: they are for
more rugged environments and for specific real-time
applications; they are not connected to the Internet or
wide-area networks; and, they are typically equipped
with more elaborate input/output interfaces than PCs.
PLCs are commonly connected to a programming device—usually a regular PC—and disconnected after a
program is loaded.
Stuxnet is interested only in Siemens Simatic S7
PLCs, which are programmed by Windows PCs running Simatic Step 7 software.11 After Stuxnet infects a
PC running Simatic Step 7, Stuxnet will then load its
own malicious blocks into a connected Simatic S7 PLC.
The malicious blocks are capable of hiding their presence from the human operator. Stuxnet also checks
the type of central processing unit (CPU) in the PLC,
the presence of Profibus (a standard industrial network bus), and the presence of at least 33 frequency
converter drives made by Fararo Paya (Iran) or Vacon
(Finland). The reason is that the payload evidently is
aimed at affecting these specific frequency converter
drives. The creators of Stuxnet had knowledge that
7

the intended target PLCs would have these frequency
converter drives.
Payload.
Stuxnet chooses one of three infection sequences
for delivering the payload, depending on the configuration of the Siemens Simatic S7 PLC. In actuality,
the first two sequences are similar, while the third sequence is disabled; hence, there is essentially one infection sequence and one payload. The payload gives
Stuxnet the capability to modify data to and from the
connected frequency converter drives. By modifying
the data, Stuxnet can alter the operating frequencies
of the drives to make them fail over time. According
to later reports, the target was Iran’s Natanz uranium
enrichment plant; the sabotage was deliberately subtle
so that the human operators would be mystified about
the cause.12
According to the control systems security firm
Langner Communications, the payload in Stuxnet also
attempts to disrupt turbine control systems. If this theory is valid, it would suggest that Stuxnet could have
been created for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant
as well as the Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The
payload modules aimed at the turbine control systems
at Bushehr appear to carry out a man-in-the-middle
attack in order to pass fake input and output values to
the genuine plant control code, presumably to disrupt
the turbine control systems.
Significance and Implication.
Most malware is intended for computer systems
(e.g., stealing data, establishing backdoors), but Stuxnet was clearly designed for real-world damage (sabo8

tage) of industrial control systems. Moreover, it was
crafted deliberately to deliver a payload to a specific
high-value target. Stuxnet is too specific to worry
about its reuse by terrorists. Even if terrorists acquired
a copy of the source code, it would take an enormous
amount of effort to re-engineer a different payload.
Most likely different exploits would be needed because the exploits used by Stuxnet have mostly been
patched since its discovery.
More worrisome is that Stuxnet demonstrates that
a sufficiently determined adversary with sufficient
resources might be able to damage U.S. critical infrastructure physically through a cyberattack. The level
of effort to create Stuxnet has been estimated to cost
millions of dollars, so the required resources would
be very substantial. However, that cost is not beyond
the budget of large terrorist organizations. Terrorists
do not have to invest in creating their own custombuilt malware, but eventually will be able to buy attack tools from criminal organizations or friendly
nations. Stuxnet has gotten the attention of the world
by promoting an arms race to develop offensive (and
defensive) cybercapabilities among nations and the
underground.
In summary, Stuxnet changed a theoretical hypothesis into reality; terrorists now know that cyberattacks are not limited to computers, and investment
in cyberattacks can actually pay off in real-world
“breaking things and killing people.” There is more
likely to be a long-term affect than a short-term one.
The following sections ask if Stuxnet has had an effect in terms of motive, means, and opportunity
for terrorists.

9

TERRORIST MOTIVES AND INTEREST
IN CYBER ATTACKS
There are many logical reasons to expect terrorists
to be interested in cyberterrorism.13 First, consider their
motivations. Their main aim is clearly to gain visibility and influence by creating fear through “breaking
things and killing people.”14 Lesser goals are to maintain their operations and carry out their activities, e.g.,
fund raising, planning, recruitment, and intelligence
gathering. The cyber domain offers several benefits to
achieve those aims:
• 	
Anonymous communications with other
terrorists;
• Personal
	
safety compared to physical attacks
(e.g., bombs, suicide missions);
• Easy
	
access to online data about potential targets;
• Low cost (PC or smart phone);
• Availability of abundance of cyber attack tools;
• 	Low skill entry: many attack tools are automated, needing little expertise;
• Remote access to vulnerable targets;
• Reachability to any network-connected target;
• Connection
	
to a worldwide audience for propaganda;
• 	Asymmetry: small terrorist groups can carry
out large-scale attacks.
Terrorist Uses of the Internet.
It has been well documented that terrorists are
knowledgeable about computers and use the Internet
regularly for various activities supporting terrorism,
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such as propaganda, recruiting, communications,
planning, and intelligence gathering.15 A recent United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime report16
found that terrorists use the Internet to:
•	
Spread propaganda related to instruction,
explanations, justifications, or promotion of
terrorist activities;
• Incite violence;
• Recruit and radicalize individuals;
•	Raise funds through direct solicitation, e-commerce, the exploitation of online payment tools,
and through charitable organizations;
•	Train followers for combat tactics, the use of
explosives and of weapons;
•	
Plan and coordinate attacks, often involving
covert communication among several parties.
Internet usage has increased with changes in terrorist organizations. In the past, terrorist groups have
been mostly hierarchical, which is a more effective
structure for carrying out tasks and missions. More
recently, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Hamas
have been organized as loosely interconnected, semiindependent cells without a single commanding hierarchy, for resilience against disruption or capture. The
Internet is vital for facilitating communications and
coordination among loosely interconnected groups.
Denning pointed out that it is not simply that terrorists are using the Internet, but more significantly,
that the Internet has transformed the current practice
of terrorism.17 For instance, most terrorist groups now
have a Web presence. Al-Qaeda has been using the
Web since the late-1990s, initially through the website,
alneda.com. Today al-Qaeda has thousands of websites.
Jihadist websites are used to distribute a wide variety

11

of materials such as the writings and recordings of
Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other alQaeda leaders; videos of bombings and other terrorist
acts; fatwas (religious edicts); electronic magazines;
training manuals and videos; news reports; calls to join
the jihad; and software tools. Al-Qaeda’s online training materials have evidently been useful for planning
attacks. Reportedly, the principal architect of the 9/11
attacks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, trained high-level
al-Qaeda operatives in the use of encryption (terrorists have been captured with encrypted files on their
computers).
Besides the Web, terrorists have established groups
on social networking sites. Marc Sageman (author of
Leaderless Jihad) has noted that websites are used primarily for distributing materials and propaganda, but
it is through interactive forums and chat rooms that
relationships are built and personal bonding takes
place. Individuals are drawn online with little risk
or cost, from anywhere in the world. They can support terrorism without necessarily having to acquire
or handle explosives or anything directly harmful
to people.
In November 2003, the Saudi-owned London daily
Al-Shrq al-Awsat reported that al-Qaeda had opened a
virtual university on the Internet called al-Qaeda University for Jihad Sciences. It includes colleges for technologies related to explosive devices and to electronic
and media jihad.
Interest in Cyberattacks.
Terrorists have been active online but not at a level
of sophistication comparable to that of Stuxnet. Perhaps one of the first reported incidents was in 1997.
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A group called Internet Black Tigers, aligned with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), claimed responsibility for “suicide email bombings” against Sri
Lankan embassies over a 2-week period. The cyberattacks consisted of disk-operating systems and Web
defacements.
Many forums have sprung up to distribute manuals and tools for hacking, and to promote and coordinate cyberattacks (sometimes called “electronic
jihad”). Sites such as 7hj.7hj.com teach surfers the art
of computer attacks and trains individuals in hacking
skills to serve Islam. A 2006 report by the Jamestown
Foundation reported that most radical jihadi forums
devote an entire section to hacking.18 For example, it
reported that the al-Ghorabaa site published information about how to penetrate computer devices and intranet servers and steal passwords,19 including a 344page book on hacking techniques.20
Al-Qaeda has long supported “electronic jihad,”
particularly as a means of disrupting the U.S. economy. While truck bombs could accomplish a great deal
of physical damage, there would not be much damage
to the U.S. economy. On the other hand, a cyberattack
might have a chance to take down the entire financial
services network. Muhammad bin Ahmad as-Salim,
in a book entitled 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in
Jihad, encourages the use of electronic jihad as one of
the ways to support al-Qaeda. In another book entitled al-Zarqawi—al-Qaeda’s Second Generation, journalist Fouad Hussein describes a seven-phase war by
al-Qaeda in which the organization plans to take over
the world and turn it into an Islamic state.21
Phase 1 consisted of raising the consciousness of
Muslims worldwide after the 9/11 attacks. Phase 4,
spanning 2010 to 2013, included cyberterrorism to
damage the U.S. economy.
13

After 9/11, Osama bin Laden was quoted by the
Pakistani newspaper Ausaf as saying:
Hundreds of young men had pledged to him that they
were ready to die and that hundreds of Muslim scientists were with him and who would use their knowledge in chemistry, biology and ranging from computers to electronics against the infidels.22

This suggested that bin Laden had some capabilities of launching cyberattacks. Al-Qaeda prisoners have told interrogators about their intent to use
cyberattack tools, and captured al-Qaeda computers
have been found to contain schematics and software
for simulating catastrophic scenarios of a dam.23 AlQaeda computers have also reportedly contained evidence of surveillance of nuclear power plants, dams,
and other critical infrastructures.24 Lamar Smith, a
Representative from Texas, reported that Congress
has been briefed on al-Qaeda operatives probing the
electronic infrastructure in search of ways to disrupt
or disable power, phones, and water supplies. Smith
claimed, “There is a 50 percent chance that the next
time al Qaeda terrorists strike the United States, their
attack will include a cyberattack.”25
Has Stuxnet increased terrorist interest in cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure? In late-2010, the
popular Al-Shamukh jihadist forum called for attacks
on industrial control systems, noting the success of
Stuxnet. The Forum posted a broad overview of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems,
but not information on how to attack them. Congressional testimony after Stuxnet raised concerns about
the damage caused by a potential Stuxnet-like attack,
but no testimony warned of any imminent attack or
change in the capabilities of terrorists.26 Thus, it seems
14

that Stuxnet might have raised awareness but did not
significantly change the intent or interest of terrorists.
TERRORIST CAPABILITIES
Having established that terrorists are interested
in cyberattacks, the next question is whether terrorists are building up capabilities and skills for such
cyberattacks. There seems little doubt about their intentions, although their skill levels currently are not
nearly comparable to the level of Stuxnet. In March
2010, testimony, FBI Director Mueller stated:
We in the FBI, with our partners in the intelligence
community, believe the cyber terrorism threat is real,
and it is rapidly expanding. Terrorists have shown a
clear interest in pursuing hacking skills. And they will
either train their own recruits or hire outsiders, with
an eye toward combining physical attacks with cyber
attacks.27

It is true that a multitude of easy-to-use software
attack tools are readily available at no or low cost.
For a small investment, attacks such as DDoS can be
waged with serious and costly impact. It is also true
that Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as Hamas, al-Qaeda, Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group, Hezbollah, and the Egyptian Islamic Group are known to
be versed in information technology. However, the
type of attacks that are possible with low-cost tools
do not yet rise anywhere near the level of “breaking
things and killing people.” It is very unlikely that
any terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda will be
able to deploy a cyberattack with the sophistication
of Stuxnet. Stuxnet was developed by military expert
programmers with detailed knowledge about their
15

targets. It would take enormous time and human resources to develop that level of sophisticated skills.
Although terrorists might turn to the underground
to hire hackers with sufficient skills, Giampiero Giacomello has argued that this approach is unlikely,
because it would be far more costly than traditional
physical attacks that terrorists have used more or less
successfully in the past.28
In addition to IT skills, an important element of major cyberattacks is zero-day exploits (as used in Stuxnet), because no patch is available to defend against
them. There is a thriving market for zero-day exploits,
and it might be assumed that terrorists might be able
to buy them easily as needed. However, there is also
competition. At the recent Black Hat conference, representatives from the U.S. military and intelligence
community were among the thousands of attendees
to learn about vulnerabilities and buy exploits and
software tools, among other things. Many of the companies involved in discovering vulnerabilities and
creating exploits are in Western countries unfriendly
to terrorists, so terrorists may find it very difficult to
acquire zero-day exploits.
Denning described a model for assessing cyberterror capability that consisted of three levels:29
1. Simple-unstructured: the capability to conduct
basic hacks against individual systems using tools
created by someone else. The organization has little
target analysis, command and control, or learning
capability.
2. Advanced-structured: the capability to conduct
more sophisticated attacks against multiple systems
or networks and possibly to modify or create basic
hacking tools. The organization possesses an elementary target analysis, command and control, and
learning capability.
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3. Complex-coordinated: the capability for coordinated attacks capable of causing mass disruption
against integrated, heterogeneous defenses (including
cryptography). Ability to create sophisticated hacking
tools. Highly capable target analysis, command and
control, and organizational learning capability.
Denning reported that the barrier for entry beyond
the first level was quite high, and it would take any
organization 2-4 years to progress from level 1 to 2,
and another 6-10 years to advance to level 3. Terrorists have shown evidence mostly of level-1 activity but
arguably progressing to level 2.
Paying for Proxies.
Terrorists might find it easier to pay third parties
to carry out attacks for them, instead of developing
their own skills. There are three reasons to believe this
could be an appealing approach:
•	
A number of cybercrime organizations have
been well established for several years. For instance, the Russian Business Network (RBN) is
well known for creating the MPack malware
kit and operating the Storm botnet. The cybercrime underground deals in malware, exploits,
and attack tools, among other activities.
•	A cyberarms race has been stimulated by Stuxnet. Virtually every modern country has been
building up offensive and defensive cybercapabilities, usually within defense or intelligence
agencies. For instance, the Iranian government
reportedly has built a fairly capable hacker
group, and Iran is friendly to terrorist groups
such as Hamas and Hezbollah. As nations
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around the world develop “cyber weapons,”
it will become easier for terrorists over time to
acquire attack tools from friendly nations.
•	New for-hire hacker groups (or “cyber mercenaries”) are emerging to profit from working
for clients. For example, security firm Symantec
reported on a for-hire group of 50-100 hackers
called Hidden Lynx.30 The group is suspected
of penetrating more than 100 organizations
around the world since 2009, including U.S. defense contractors, investment banks, and security companies. It is suspected of compromising
security firm Bit9 in 2012, a company that sells
an “application whitelisting” service to other
companies. By stealing the cryptographic keys
for the Bit9 service, the hacker group was able
to compromise other companies depending
on that service, including military contracting
firms. A smaller for-hire group called Icefog
was reported by Kasperky Labs.31 This group
of 6-10 hackers seems to specialize in surgical
hit-and-run attacks on the supply chain, using
custom-made attack tools.
VULNERABILITIES IN U.S. CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES
It is well known that about 90 percent of U.S. critical infrastructure is privately owned, consisting of a
wide variety of custom-built equipment, though the
sector is moving toward more common, off-the-shelf
systems. Cybersecurity tends to be a low priority for
system administrators, and systems are difficult to
patch. Consequently, many vulnerabilities continue to
exist. Often, a mixture of private and public networks
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is used. Although the risks of public networks are
well-known, private networks can also be equally vulnerable to intrusions, though owners tend to believe
they are safer because they are not connected to public
networks.
The number of vulnerabilities appears to be increasing rapidly. A recent vulnerability report by NSS
Labs stated that SCADA/industrial control systems
(ICS) vulnerability disclosures increased from 72 in
2011 to 124 in 2012; the count represents a 600 percent.
increase from 2010.32 The 124 vulnerabilities affect the
products of 49 vendors.
Another vulnerability is the complexity and high
connectedness of systems, which increases the risk of
cascade failures (seen in past incidents with the power
grid). The government states:
This vast and diverse aggregation of highly interconnected assets, systems, and networks may also present
an attractive array of targets to domestic and international terrorists and magnify greatly the potential for
cascading failure in the wake of catastrophic natural
or manmade disasters.33

Electric systems, as an example, are not designed
to withstand or recover quickly from damage inflicted simultaneously on multiple components. A wellplanned, coordinated attack could take down portions
of the electric power system for a long time.
Although vulnerabilities exist, intruders need expertise to be successful, and chances are that only a
small number of people have the necessary expertise
for a given control system, which is often proprietary
or customized. Although not many attacks on critical infrastructures have been publicized, attacks have
been known to happen. In August 2012, Saudi Ara19

bia’s state oil company, Saudi Aramco, saw more than
30,000 systems infected by a malware attack. Critical
functions like oil production were unaffected, but basic oil operations were taken down. Shortly after, Qatar’s liquified natural gas company, RasGas, suffered
a malware attack that had the same modus operandi.
Cyberattacks might become easier, given the recent invention of the SHODAN search engine by John
Matherly. SHODAN is a search engine that finds specific types of computers (routers, servers, etc.) using a
variety of filters on service banners. SHODAN crawls
the Internet for publicly accessible devices, concentrating on SCADA systems. Cybersecurity researchers
use SHODAN to search for vulnerable SCADA systems. A student, Eireann Leverett, has used SHODAN
to demonstrate he could find 10,000 ICS connected to
the public Internet. These included water and sewage
plants, which were easy to compromise due to weak
security.34
WHY NOT A MAJOR CYBERATTACK
Having established motive, means, and opportunity for terrorists, the natural question is why a major
cyberattack has not happened yet. It seems that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups still prefer bombs and
physical attacks, even after Stuxnet.35 In the absence of
an attack, a case could be argued that cyberterrorism
is more of a hypothetical threat than a real one.36 However, there is debate about whether an actual cyberattack by terrorists has happened.37 No major attacks
have occurred, according to the public record, some
observers have speculated that attacks have happened
but have been kept confidential so as not to disclose
weaknesses in the national infrastructure.
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In 2007, Denning postulated three indicators that
could precede a successful cyberterrorism attack:38
1. Failed cyberattacks against critical infrastructures, such as ICS. Unlike the case with the professionally developed Stuxnet, Denning expected that
the first cyberterrorist attack would likely be unsuccessful, considering that even terrorist kinetic attacks
frequently fail.
2. Research and training labs, where terrorists
simulate their cyberattacks against targets, test attack
tools, and train people. Israel reportedly had centrifuges at its Dimona complex to test Stuxnet on.
3. Extensive discussions and planning relating
to attacks against critical infrastructures, not just
websites.
So far, none of these indicators has been observed,
which would imply that terrorists are not trying hard
to prepare for cyberattacks.
Conway has argued against the likelihood of cyberterrorism in the near future.39 Her argument consists of these reasons:
• Violent jihadis’ IT knowledge is not superior.
• Real-world attacks are difficult enough.
•	Hiring hackers would compromise operational
security.
•	For a true terrorist event, spectacular moving
images are crucial.
•	Terrorists will not favor a cyberattack with the
potential to be hidden, portrayed as an accident, or otherwise remaining unknown.
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation of
the lack of observed cyberattacks is the cost-benefit
argument put forth by Giacomello.40 He compared the

21

costs of traditional physical terrorist attacks with cyberattacks of the “break things and kill people” type.
Specifically, Giacomello estimated the costs of three
cyberterrorism scenarios aimed at the power grid; a
hydroelectric dam; and an air traffic control system. If
the power grid was viewed as an unlikely target, fatalities will be indirect or accidental. For a hydroelectric dam, the cost is based on a historical incident of an
insider sabotaging the controls at the dam. Somewhat
arbitrarily, the estimate assumed two proficient hackers with supporting personnel, totaling up to $1.3 million. For an air traffic control system, a higher number of skilled hackers are needed to compromise the
system, prevent the air controllers from detecting and
responding to the intrusion, and defeat built-in safety
mechanisms. Again, it is not explicitly stated, but a
year of work seems to be assumed, since the total is
based on a year’s salary. The resulting estimated cost
was up to $3 million.
For comparison, Giacomello pointed out that the
World Trade Center bomb cost only $400 to build,
yet, it injured 1,000 people and caused $550 million of
physical damages. The March 2004 attacks in Madrid,
exploding 10 simultaneous bombs on four commuter
trains using mining explosives and cellphones, cost
about $10,000 to carry out. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that the 9/11 attacks cost between $400,000
and $500,000 to plan and execute.41
An examination of these comparative costs makes
it clear that bombs are a much cheaper approach than
cyberattacks by orders of magnitude. Stuxnet, estimated to have cost millions of dollars, does not change
the cost-benefit comparison. At the present time and
in the near future, cyberattacks of the “break things
and kill people” type require an enormous amount of
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effort by highly skilled experts. In contrast, bombs can
be made cheaply and deployed without skilled effort.
In addition, physical attacks are appealing because of
the higher certainty of success.
This argument points to two fallacies in popular
thinking. First, there is sometimes a misconception
about the cost of cyberattacks. For example, Weimann
stated that cyberterrorism would be attractive because
cyberattacks require only a PC and Internet connection. This is true for simple attacks, but terrorists
would aim for more sophisticated attacks requiring
a high level of skill. Second, there was concern that
Stuxnet could fall into the hands of terrorists, who
would then use it against the United States. Clearly,
by now, Stuxnet would no longer be effective after the
world had seen its set of exploits. Although terrorists
could modify Stuxnet for their own purposes, it is a
high-precision weapon designed for a specific target.
Terrorists would need to replace at least its payload
and exploits, which would require a high level of expertise and time and still have an uncertain chance
of success.
However, the cost-benefit argument does not completely rule out the possibility of cyberattacks as a
means to complement physical attacks. In that case,
the cyberattacks could be much more modest, not necessarily of the “break things and kill people” type. For
instance, a cyberattack that takes down a communication network or emergency system during a crisis
caused by a physical attack could be very effective in
amplifying the total impact.
In addition, it is quite possible that development
costs for Stuxnet-like malware could decrease in
the future (as is usually the case with software and
hardware). If that happens, the cost-benefit argument
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could predict a point in the future when cyberattacks
become attractive for terrorists.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Previous sections have examined motive, means,
and opportunity for cyberterrorism. Our findings can
be summarized as:
•	Terrorists are familiar with IT technologies and
depend on the Internet for many common activities, similar to most people.
•	Terrorists are interested in cyberattacks but not
at a high level of sophistication yet.
•	Terrorists have not built up a high level of cyber skills or capabilities (e.g., acquiring zeroday exploits) yet.
•	Instead of developing their own capabilities,
terrorists might seek help from friendly nations
or for-hire hackers.
•	Vulnerabilities existing in national infrastructures present opportunities for cyberattacks
but require a high level of expertise to exploit.
•	The absence of cyberterrorist attacks might be
explained most simply by a cost-benefit argument that physical attacks are orders of magnitude less costly than cyberattacks.
•	Stuxnet has not seemed to have changed significantly the motive, means, or opportunity. And,
despite concerns by some, it has not changed
the cost-benefit trade-off either.
The last point implies that even after Stuxnet, terrorists still face a considerable cost barrier to carrying
out large-scale cyberattacks. Therefore, such cyberattacks are probably unlikely in the near future. How-
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ever, Stuxnet does have long-term implications, because the world has started on a cyberarms race. In the
long term, there is likely to be a proliferation of major
“cyber weapons,” which might fall into the hands
of terrorists.
There seems little that can be done to change motive for terrorists. Some have proposed the idea of
deterrence, but it is questionable whether deterrence
is possible in cyberwarfare in the same way that
nuclear deterrence worked through fear of mutually
assured destruction (MAD). Deterrence is predicated
on the possibility of discouraging terrorists from attack by presenting a strong likelihood of retaliation.
Unfortunately, the cyberenvironment is completely
different from the nuclear environment, in which
nuclear weapons can be traced and counted. In order
to be effective, cyberdeterrence must overcome a few
practical obstacles.
The first and most obvious problem is attribution—
the identification of the real source of a cyberattack.
Attackers have the advantage of plausible deniability
in cyberspace. Attribution is difficult because cyberattacks can be anonymized in many ways. In malware
attacks, the creator is very difficult to discover from
code disassembly. The second practical problem, even
if attribution can be solved, is credible capacity for
destructive retaliation. Probably no one doubts the offensive capability of the United States, but it has not
been demonstrated yet.
Also, there seems little that can be done to change
means for terrorists. Although terrorists do not have a
high level of cybercapabilities yet, it would be practically difficult to prevent them from acquiring skills or
help from third parties. Cybersecurity knowledge is
freely available, and the barrier is low for terrorists to
acquire training in cybersecurity.
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The only factor that is feasible to address, then,
is opportunity. Specifically, policies should enhance
protection of national infrastructures to reduce the
risk exposure to cyberattacks. Fortunately, the U.S.
Government has already placed top priority on vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures, and a new Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA)
is under consideration, which is intended to facilitate
security information sharing and enhance protection
of critical infrastructures. However, it is not certain
whether the Act will be sufficiently comprehensive
and enforceable. For instance, some of the measures
are voluntary rather than mandatory. Without mandatory measures to improve critical infrastructure security, it will be important to implement appropriate
economic incentives to encourage desired actions.
Also, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) provides a unifying framework that integrates
a range of efforts designed to improve protection of
critical infrastructures. NIPP aims to prevent, deter,
neutralize, or mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack
or natural disaster, and to strengthen national preparedness, response, and recovery in the event of an
emergency. It takes a risk-management approach consisting of identifying assets and assessing threats and
vulnerabilities.
All measures to reduce the opportunity for cyberterrorists are recommended. However, the adaptiveness and resourcefulness of terrorists should not be
underestimated. The NIPP says:
As security measures around more predictable targets
increase, terrorists are likely to shift their focus to less
protected targets. Enhancing countermeasures to address any one terrorist tactic or target may increase the
likelihood that terrorists will shift to another.42
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The openness of the security problem means that it
will be practically impossible to fix every vulnerability
and eliminate all opportunities for terrorists. Perhaps
policies should recognize that cyberattacks are inevitable and instead address the cost-benefit proposition
for terrorists. If systems can be designed to increase
costs and reduce benefits to adversaries, attacks will
become less appealing.
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